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PLO'S METHODS OF FINANCING TERRORIST GROUPS SCRUTINIZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 1 Sep 79 pp 40-42

[Article by Ahmed al-Dajani]

[Text] Beirut, Tuesday [30 Aug]--Within 2 months a group of men and women will gather around a secret conference table in a big European city in order to discuss a number of bothersome points. An outsider might get the impression that they represented one international organization or another. It is clear that a number of them are of Middle Eastern extraction, while others come from South America, Japan, and Europe. Is this one of the many sub-commissions of the United Nations meeting to take up the problem of human rights? Or is it a meeting of the managers of an international corporation working out their sales program for the coming year? Both assumptions are wide of the mark. These normal-looking people represent the world's pace-setting terrorist organizations, and the foremost item on their agenda will be their budget, which runs into billions of dollars.

The last time that a meeting of international terrorist groups was held was in Beirut in September 1978. Delegations were present from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Italian Red Brigades, the IRA [Irish Republican Army], the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Army Fraction, the Argentine Monteneros, the Spanish ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group (a Basque socialist separatist group)], and the Japanese Red Army. The minutes of that meeting will provide the guidelines for this year's conference, which will presumably be held in Milan.

But in the intervening period the terrorists' interests have changed radically. In 1978 they were still in agreement that the tactics of Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO, had worked. By a moderate position and political arguments rather than violent action, the PLO seemed to have succeeded in gaining a respectable status and a certain recognition that few had thought possible. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel has disturbed that picture to a certain extent. The terrorist groups of the "rejectionist front"--the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine [PFLP] and the General Headquarters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [GHQ-PFLP] (a different group), along with the Arab Liberation Front, have gained in

prestige. Formerly practically excluded by El Fatah and the conservative members of the PLO, they are now received in the grand manner. Arafat has stated publicly that a "more aggressive" policy is now desired. And Arafat calls the tune, for his PLO finances the activities of most of the other terrorist organizations in the Middle East with an estimated \$300 million a year.

Where does this money come from, and where does it go? The banker of the terrorist groups in the Middle East is the Palestinian National Fund, established by the PLO, which last met in January of this year in Damascus. Money pours into this fund from four main sources:

- 1) A "tax for the liberation fight" of 5 to 10 percent on the earnings of Palestinians working abroad. This money comes into the fund through the PLO.
- 2) Gifts to the fund by Arab countries. There is no fixed amount, but it is expected that the Arab governments will make donations in keeping with their national incomes.
- 3) Investments. The fund receives large amounts in cash. Part of this money is invested in short-term loans, part of it in blocks of "blue chip" stocks.
- 4) Criminal activities, such as robberies and extortion ["protection" rackets]. In addition, the terrorist groups get international help, most of it in kind, such as weapons, but sometimes also in the form of expert help by instructors or propaganda experts.

About 300,000 Palestinians are working in various Arab oil countries. The PLO has prevailed upon the employers of these Palestinians to deduct the "tax for the liberation fight" from their pay in advance, almost exactly as is done with income taxes, and then turn the whole amount over to the PLO.

The Arab countries that make regular contributions to the Palestinian National Fund are Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Syria pays for the most part in kind rather than in cash, arguing that in sheltering the Palestinian Liberation Army the country is contributing as much if not more. According to the PLO, countries that "do not shine for generosity" include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and North Yemen.

Besides making contributions to the fund, some countries support their own favorite terrorist organization with direct donations. Thus Libya and Syria give the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine \$30 million a year, because they share the views of that group, which split off, under the leadership of Najef Hawatmeh, from the terrorist physician Dr Georges Habbash's Popular Front. Every attempt to reach a reconciliation with Israel is totally rejected; Israel must be terrorized by suicide commando actions.

Apart from short-term loans, the fund invests in "safe" stocks, and has a portfolio worth over \$60 million, including shares in shipyards, oil

tankers, television stations, and hotels. These investments are made mostly in the United States and the Middle East. There is even an \$8 million investment in a poultry farm in Syria.

Transfer of funds to the operating groups and to families of "martyrs" is handled by the Arab Bank, whose headquarters is in Amman, the capital of Jordan. This banking institution is said to have a strong influence on the banking activities of that country.

In spite of all this financial support, mistakes are made. In particular, Arafat is a real soft touch. Penniless Arab groups that go to him for money are almost always sent away with a handsome check. But generous gestures of that kind cause great chaos in the financial section of the PLO.

The international terrorist Carlos, who made a name for himself for his extravagant life style and an excessive interest in women, had a very bizarre way of getting rid of extra money. All of his girl friends all over the world got a luxurious fur jacket from him. But what they did not know was that terrorist technicians had lined each jacket with napalm, so that at any moment the wearers could be turned into human bombs.

The PLO has built up an organization with offices and a paid staff in a hundred countries. Heads of the bigger offices in Europe and North America are paid about \$1,500 a month, with a special allowance for "entertainment." The war in Lebanon has cost the PLO about \$100 million in cash for weapons from the communist countries. Besides that the PLO lost an estimated 3,000 soldiers in the fighting. But the organization was not in financial trouble for long. At the time of the Arab summit conference last November in Bagdad it was decided to appropriate \$250 million for the PLO, besides \$100 million to \$150 million set aside for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The following distribution scheme was set up for the \$250 million:

\$50 million for the reserve fund,

\$50 million for the general budget of the PLO,

\$10 million for the families of "martyrs," and

\$140 million to be divided as follows: 58 percent for El Fatah, 10 percent for As-Saiqua, 7 percent each for the 4 terrorist groups of the "Rejection Front," and 2 percent each for the Palestinian Liberation Front and the People's Battle Front.

Until recently the terrorist groups in the Middle East--unlike their German and South American counterparts--have not resorted to criminal activities to raise money. But the rising costs involved in terrorism have brought about a change here. An increasing number of groups from the Middle East are now deriving a not inconsiderable portion of their income from extortion, smuggling, theft, and fraud. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Headquarters [of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and the Palestinian Liberation Front, which have their bases

in Lebanon, are said to be involved in such operations. It is assumed that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is behind the theft of the cargoes of six ships in Tripoli, Lebanon, last year, and it is said that the plundering of several smaller ships used for arms shipping is to be ascribed to this Popular Front as well.

The Russians have always been fervent supporters of the various Palestinian liberation movements, both directly and through their Cuban satellites. Finances and training facilities are provided. It is generally assumed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union finances portions of the PLO propaganda machine, including the Palestinian radio station. In addition, they provide intensive assistance in the extensive training of terrorist patrols.

At this very moment about 7,000 Cubans, supported by 1,500 Russians and 116 East Germans, are busy training terrorist groups from all parts of the world at 3 training camps in South Yemen--Hauf, Mikallah, and Al-Gheidah. Members of the West German Red Army Fraction and a number of South Moluccans from our own Netherlands recently visited there. In addition, another terrorist organization returned to the Netherlands after intensive training--the Red Resistance Front, an obscure group estimated at 12 persons. It is feared that they will soon put their training into practice.

At the same time there has been a report of a training camp for terrorists 300 kilometers south of Tripoli in Sebha, where IRA members and Palestinian groups have gone through a training program.

The exchange of training facilities between international terrorist organizations has led to an unheard-of cooperation in terrorist attacks. The most spectacular operations have seemed to be international in composition. In 1973 a mixed group of Palestinians and Venezuelans captured a Japanese jumbo jet between Paris and Tokyo. In 1974 the Japanese Red Army occupied the French Embassy in the Hague under the supervision of the Palestinian office of the terrorist Carlos in Paris; they made use of hand grenades that had been stolen by the Baader-Meinhof gang from an American arsenal in the FRG.

Terrorism may pay in terms of publicity and ransom money, but the teams and their supplies are definitely not cheap. Safe training areas, transportation, airline tickets, faked passports, and financial means for day to day subsistence are among the fixed expenses. An AK 47 Kalashnikov rifle, for example, costs about \$480 on the black market, and a forged British passport about \$500. It also costs a minimum of half a million dollars to keep a fugitive terrorist out of the hands of his pursuers. Besides that, it is necessary to support an international network that has houses at its disposal that can serve as hideaways.

It is generally assumed that the Munich bloodbath, "financed" by Libya, cost \$2.5 million, of which the terrorist Carlos got \$1 million for his part in it. The following year the Baader-Meinhof gang assaulted the West German embassy in Stockholm with weapons obtained from a naturalized Italian who had stolen them from a Swiss arsenal. In 1975 the terrorist Carlos led

a team of two Germans and three Palestinians who held ten Arab oil ministers hostage in OPEC headquarters in Vienna. In 1976 a German was one of the leaders of a group of Palestinians who seized a French Airbus on the way to Entebbe. In 1977 a Palestinian returned the favor by running the show in Mogadishu, Somalia, in support of the kidnapping of Schleyer, chairman of the West German employers' association. Lastly, in June of this year the public prosecutor in West Berlin accused five Lebanese, an Algerian, and a German of a conspiracy aimed at blowing up the biggest oil supply depot in the city. According to well-informed sources, this group had "close ties to the PLO."

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GERARD DEPRez RUNS FOR PSC CHAIRMANSHIP

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by C.-L. Binnemans: "Gerard Deprez Is Candidate in PSC Against Paul Vanden Boeynants"]

[Text] Vice Prime Minister Paul Vanden Boeynants' chef de cabinet is a candidate for the position of PSC [Social Christian Party] chairman. This means he is running against his boss.

This confrontation, which is now public knowledge, may prove to be oddly amusing. But not for the candidate in question, Gerard Deprez. For him, and likewise for his "challenger," politics is a serious business.

"I realize," he told us, "that this is a very ticklish situation. This race will make no change whatsoever in our relations. My talent is not commensurable with Paul Vanden Boeynants' talent and excellence as a statesman. But I do believe I can perform a useful role."

Gerard Deprez is 36, tall, good-looking, articulate, and self-confident. He is a behind-the-scenes man rather than a showman, and above all, rather than a public man. He is far-sighted in his reasoning and never at a loss for an answer. In 1973, he was an instructor at UCL [Catholic University of Louvain] and working for a doctorate in sociology when Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb suggested he join his young team of modern thinkers and tacticians in the PSC.

Deprez eventually joined them after receiving his doctorate in May 1974. Then followed a series of staff assignments in the Ministry of French Culture, first under Minister Grafe, and later under Minister Van Aal. Deprez then worked for 4 years in PSC headquarters on Rue des Deux-Eglises.

"My duties involved improving the organization of relations with the CVP [Flemish wing of Social Christian Party] and the international relations of French-speaking Social Christians."

In May 1978, he became political secretary general of the PSC-CVP along with his Flemish counterpart, R. Charzerie. He subsequently entered the Martens government as VDB's [Paul Vanden Boeynants] chef de cabinet.

Political Profile

"My association with Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb was very fruitful. I used to meet Wilfried Martens every day. My office was next to his. I attended all meetings of the PSC executive committee as well as those of the Social Christian 'presidium.' During the most recent governmental interregnum, I was also a member of the three staffs assisting Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, Paul Vanden Boeynants, and Wilfried Martens in their duties as 'informateur' [person appointed by the king to confer with party leaders and gather information about what program would be acceptable to a parliamentary majority] or 'formateur' [position offered by the king to a prospective candidate--prime minister designate--who then attempts to form a government]."

Gerard Deprez believes this hard interparty and intraparty horse-trading activity refutes those critics who, while conceding he has the advantage of youth, reproachfully argue he has the disadvantage of certain political inexperience.

"My reputation is in no way commensurable with the prestige Paul Vanden Boeynants enjoys within the party and in the country.

"We have relatively different political profiles, in other words, different qualifications and experience. But which person's profile corresponds best to the expression of the character of today's PSC and to its requirements in the period we are now entering?

"Now as far as the actual campaign and election are concerned, no matter how much I keep telling myself that I am not entering this race to lose, I am realistic."

Native of the Ardennes

Gerard Deprez was born in Luxembourg Province. Married at 23, he has three children, a daughter of 13, one of 10, and a 7-month old son.

He and his family recently returned from a 3-week vacation on the coast: "at Helst in a nice little inexpensive apartment my wife found through the classified ads."

It was definitely time for a vacation. After last December's parliamentary election campaign, the negotiations over the formation of a new government, and the European election campaign, his wife and children felt they were not seeing much of him.

"That vacation gave me the opportunity to reread Marguerite Yourcenar's 'L'Oeuvre au Noir' [Gloomy Work] and especially her 'Memoires de Hadrien' [Hadrian's Memoirs]. My favorite author, my favorite books.

"To such a point, that I gave my young son the name of Hadrien, with an 'H'. His first name is Francois, after his grandfather, my father who was shot by a German firing squad in Noville in December 1944 during the Battle of the Bulge. Then Hadrien as middle name. Then Joseph, after my godfather, a very simple man, a small provincial merchant whom I loved so much."

As a native of the Ardennes, Deprez likes the open spaces and the wind, is found of walking and physical exercise.

A Real Choice

How does he plan to conduct his campaign for the chairmanship?

"In the field by making myself better known through acceptance of all invitations to speak I receive.

"I want a more unified, more democratic, and more effective PSC, one that defends its positions, 'federates in unity,' and accepts the challenges of the future.

"On the basic issues, I will take no inopportune initiative likely to divide the party. I will offer voters a real choice. I will do everything conducive to strengthening unity and credibility."

His decision to run was made and released much before Paul Vanden Boeynants revealed his intentions.

"As of yesterday, we had discussed the matter on four separate occasions, sometimes at great length. But the election has not been rigged. I have requested nothing from VDB. And he is requesting nothing from me."

The voting, by mail, will start on 27 September. Ballots must be received by 8 October. The counting of the votes will be a ticklish matter. The results will be interesting, regardless of the outcome.

Gerard Deprez is patiently preparing to spend a few busy weeks, while continuing to fully discharge his duties as chef de cabinet for an efficient and demanding minister.

He hopes that horseback riding may eventually provide him the relaxation he needs. But his riding thus far has shown him to be a "very poor horseman."

He has never touched a tennis racket, but someone did advise him to take up tennis, as a way of getting better acquainted with his boss.

"That's something I will never do! As everybody knows, Paul Vanden Boeynants' tennis is virtually of championship class. He wouldn't let me win even one game!"

STATISTICS ON TRADE WITH ARAB COUNTRIES PUBLISHED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 25 Aug 79 pp 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18

[Text] GREECE'S aspirations of becoming the European bridge into the Middle East will shortly receive a significant boost with the establishing, after seemingly endless delays, of an Arab-Greek Chamber of Commerce and Development. The importance of the Chamber in the context of Greek-Arab relations lies in the fact that it will be formally recognised by both Arab and Greek governments

and, perhaps for the first time, it will create a real partnership between the two parties, giving both Arabs and Greeks equal rights in its organisation through equal participation in the Chamber's board of Directors and in the different Committees to be established.

A Presidential Decree presenting the statutes of the new Chamber will soon be published in

the Government Gazette and it is hoped that the Chamber's first General Assembly will be organised before the end of the year. Its objectives have been stated as the development of economic (including tourist) relations between Greece and the Arab countries and the new chamber will be similar in operation to those previously established in the UK and other European

countries which have proved successful in the past.

After the statutes have been published and before the first General Assembly is called, the Chamber will be represented by a Joint Administrative Committee of ten members, five Arabs proposed by the heads of the Arab missions in Greece and five Greeks nominated by the Ministry of Commerce. In fact one of the main duties of the Administrative Committee will be to organise the General Assembly which is tentatively scheduled to meet in October/November this year. The Chamber's Chairman and Board Members will emerge from elections to be held at the Assembly. It is planned that the Chairman will be Greek, the Vice-chairman Arab, the Secretary General Arab and the Treasurer Greek. Candidates for the Chairmanship and Board members must be existing members of the new Chamber and as members can only be accepted companies or persons working in

the field of Arab-Greek economic activity. Arab candidates will be proposed by the Union of Arab Chambers of Commerce.

The above gives a broad indication of the make-up of the

proposed new Chamber whose activities will largely be similar to the existing Hellenic-Arab Chamber for Development and Cooperation (CDC) which itself has been in existence for about two years. The CDC will in fact be absorbed into the new Chamber of Commerce and its resources will undoubtedly form an invaluable asset to the new organisation. The CDC was established by Presidential Decree in June 1977 and since then, despite only limited resources and manpower, has succeeded in establishing itself as a major focal point for Greek-Arab relations. In fact once the new Chamber's Joint Administrative Committee has been established, the Chamber will take over the CDC's Honorary and Ordinary members, its person-

nel and other assets.

The CDC's level of activity since its inception was highlighted by its organisation in June of last year of the first Greek-Arab Investment Meeting (GAIM) in Athens. While no direct significant Arab investment has so far been attributed to the meeting, GAIM represented a significant step in the right direction since it was not only the CDC's first meeting (and held under the auspices of Coordination Minister Mitsotakis) but also the first meeting of its kind in Greece. Apart from explaining to the 100 odd Arab participants at the meeting the whys and wherefores of investing in Greece, the Greek side also presented nearly 80 concrete proposals for investments of Arab capital in Greek projects representing a total investment value of around 2.5 billion dollars. From these figures alone it is apparent that there is no shortage of Greek companies interested in obtaining Arab partner-

ship and finance and the same is true in many ways of those on the Arab side in wishing to invest in Greece. The question arises as to why no significant investment has materialised in the past and the answer to this seems far from clear. Blame has been laid on the Greek government for not providing sufficient incentives, on Greek industrialists for often having, as one observer put it, "the nationalistic feeling of selling out to foreigners", and on a host of other factors. The fact of the matter is however that the Arabs are investing their capital abroad and that only a minor part of that capital if any is coming into Greece; in the final analysis it is the Greek government who must take the blame for this low level of investment.

There is a further investment meeting to be organised by the CDC (in fact by an off-shoot called the Greek Council for the Promotion of Arab-Euro-Greek Investments) and scheduled for the 2nd to the 6th December at the Athens Hilton. The meeting will be called AEGIS '79 and is being organised under the auspices again of the Minister of Coordination Mr. Mitsotakis.

AEGIS stands for Arab-Euro-Greek Investment Symposium and, as the name suggests, its objective is to promote triangular joint ventures between Europeans supplying modern technology and management, Greeks offering the advantages of the geographic proximity of their production location to the Arab markets, and the Arabs participating in the capital and providing market outlets. It has been stressed before that such triangular cooperation is very important to the future development of the Greek economy not only in creating additional employment, but also in

Greece's trade with selected Arab countries (in thousand drs.)

	1976		1977		1978	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Algeria	32,645	608,581	16,929	514,000	1,513,000	1,513,000
Bahrain	-	-	215	73,804	88,400	88,400
Egypt	2,818,425	2,238,981	2,813,500	2,813,500	3,261,000	3,261,000
Iran	5,945,497	864,901	5,405,992	765,172		
Iraq	2,638,268	885,365	1,667,355	1,178,201	1,162,000	1,162,000
Jordan	1,397	772,838	7,949	658,762	943,000	943,000
Kuwait	1,796	607,932	1,878,404	801,066	699,000	699,000
Lebanon	205,231	805,929	36,178	1,221,320	1,484,000	1,484,000
Libya	1,711,240	4,778,229	1,955,317	4,599,000	4,180,000	4,180,000
Morocco	263,317	57,383	437,066	186,376	82,400	82,400
Oman	-	-	1,393	59,324	95,100	95,100
Qatar	-	-	93	152,520	292,800	292,800
Saudi Arabia	15,281,879	4,151,579	12,433,448	4,898,369	7,458	7,458
Sudan	252,093	243,061	794,593	192,176	169,700	169,700
Syria	1,912,233	1,286,901	2,044,728	1,003,983	1,087,000	1,087,000
Tunisia	4,185,959	378,950	3,371,534	206,926	955,000	955,000
UAE	-	-	491	534,872	756,000	756,000

improving considerably the competitiveness of Greek companies in the international field through providing modern technology and know-how and, equally important, introducing more

modern management techniques into Greek manufacturing and production. The provisional programme for AEGIS '79 is included in the accompanying box and generally the aim of the

Preliminary programme for AEGIS '79 Arab-Euro-Greek Investment Meeting

SUNDAY, 2nd December '79

- Arrival
- Registration, HILTON HOTEL
- Welcome Reception

MONDAY, 3rd December '79

- Opening
- Speech of Minister Mr. Mitsotakis:
"The objectives of the Greek industrial policy"
- Speech N.N.: "The impact of Greece's entry into the European Community for the Greek - Arab relations"
- Report of Mr. Al Hualfi*: "The Arab - Hellenic Bank"
- Luncheon
- 1. Sector meetings: Construction, construction materials, aluminium products
- 2. Mining: general, kaolin; perlite; bentonite
- Dinner

TUESDAY, 4th December '79

- Sector meetings continued:
- 3. Shipping; ship-building; ship - repairing; ship - demolishing
- 4. Machinery; equipment manufacturing
- Luncheon
- Sector meetings continued:
- 5. Clothing; shoes; leather; leather-goods; tanning - furs
- 6. Tourist industry
- Evening free

WEDNESDAY, 5th December '79

- Sector meetings continued:
- 7. Food and beverage industry
- 8. Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics
- 9. Film and TV - production
- Luncheon
- Closing session: Summaries
- Closing dinner offered by Minister Mr. Mitsotakis

THURSDAY, 6th December '79

- All - day excursion by car or by cruiser

*to be confirmed

meeting will be to supply information on the following topics:

- Greek industrial policy
- the impact of Greece's entry

into the European Community on the Greek-Arab relations

- the potentialities of the following Greek economic sectors: construction; construction materials; shipping, ship-building, repairing and scrapping; film and TV-production; clothing; shoes, leather and leather-goods; pharmaceuticals; machinery and equip-

ment manufacturing; aluminium products; mining; food and beverages; tourist industry;

- specific investment projects.

More support for contractors

While it is generally agreed that Greek-Arab economic ties have been developing relatively slowly over the past few years, despite much contact at government level, there are two areas in which significant success has been recorded. These are in the high level of activity of technical and construction companies in the Middle Eastern countries and in the quite remarkable success of the new Volos-Syria ferry route.

Regarding Greek construction activity in the Arab world, it is interesting to note that the success in this sector has been achieved by private enterprise and with virtually no governmental support. It is estimated that there are currently around two dozen Greek construction companies active in the Middle East

involved in contracts (mainly infra-structure works) valued at around \$5 billion, although this figure must be taken as only a guide as estimates of the true value of Middle East business to Greek construction companies varies according to banking and construction sources from \$2 to \$8 billion. A recent publication from the Technical Chamber of Greece gave a breakdown of construction company activity in the Middle East and Africa and this, along with an indication of total construction expenditure in some Arab countries, is reproduced in the accompanying tables.

While this success, as mentioned above, has been for the greater part due to private initiative rather than government efforts, one sector in which the government, albeit indirectly, has contributed to the effort has been through the National Bank of Greece who, along with many of the foreign banks in the country, has issued letters of credit, bank guarantees and performance bonds

as requested by most of the Arab government contracting agencies.

Even in this area, however, some sources claim that not enough has been done and the help offered by the National Bank, for instance, has come about more from the personal interest and pressure of its governor, Professor Angelopoulos, than from any direct government initiative.

A much more positive government interest in the sector of Greek construction activity abroad is called for if the sector is to realise its full potential and not lose out to foreign competition. As an example, one source pointed to the recent granting of a \$200 million construction contract by a Middle Eastern state to a southern

European country after the personal intervention of the latter's Prime Minister. Situations such as this emphasise the importance of these construction contracts and the high level of competition which contractors must face in bidding for them. Obviously construction companies need all the help they can get, from banks and government alike, in securing new work.

As has been pointed out in the past, the issuing of guarantees by Greek banks, according to Bank of Greece regulations, must be associated with repatriation to Greece of 10 percent of the contract value of the project by completion date. This in itself

represents a major source of foreign capital inflow for Greece without representing a particularly onerous burden for the Greek contractor, since he would import a certain percentage of his foreign exchange earnings into Greece anyway. To gauge the level of this flow of foreign exchange into the country is difficult. It is reported that as of March 1977 the National Bank had guaranteed some \$300 million for Arab construction projects and assuming that these guarantees covered projects of a total value

Construction activity in selected Middle Eastern countries 1977 and 1978
(in \$ million)

Country	1977			1978		
	Equipment	Materials	Others	Total const. expenditure	Total const. expenditure	% change
Bahrain	58	120	142	320	259	-19
Egypt	190	690	833	1,713	1,182	-31
Iran	675	2,440	2,190	5,305	3,873	-27
Iraq	366	1,150	1,234	2,750	3,355	+ 22
Jordan	35	135	150	320	422	+ 32
Kuwait	107	425	488	1,020	1,071	+ 5
Libya	253	720	460	1,433	1,247	-13
Oman	79	214	190	483	382	-21
Qatar	63	210	188	461	309	-33
Saudi Arabia	1,198	4,290	4,902	10,390	11,845	+ 14
Syria	72	243	315	630	523	-17
UAE	290	780	890	1,960	1,235	-37
TOTAL	3,306	11,417	11,982	26,785	25,703	- 5

Source: adapted from report by Plantecon Overseas (Research)

somewhere between \$2 billion and \$3 billion, the 10 percent repatriation requirement represents a significant inflow of foreign capital. There is however a significant percentage of Greek construction work abroad for which performance bonds and guarantees are issued by US and other banks abroad which are naturally not associated with any repatriation requirements.

A further factor effecting the construction scene is that of Greek labour availability to work abroad and the increasing wage bill for those Greeks working on overseas contracts. A Greek working for a contractor in the Middle East can expect up to three times the salary he might obtain at home (plus local expenses in addition) and these increasing levels make Greek skilled labour less competitive than workers from traditionally low cost labour sources such as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Volos-Syria take-off

The success of the roll-on roll-off ferry service operating between Volos and Syria which came into operation in 1977 has completely lived up to expectations and in many ways far exceeded them. In the last two years cargo traffic through Volos has increased from 20,000 tons carried by one ferry in 1977 to an expected 1.5 million tons this year carried by the six ferries which will be operational on the route by the end of this year.

The two Syrian ports which are handling the Syrian end of the service are Tartus (the more modern and more important of the two) and Lattakia and the introduction of two further vessels

on the 42 hour Volos-Syria route next year, together with the proposed rail ro-ro service between Volos and Lattakia scheduled for 1981, will see even further progress and greater

tonnages handled on the route in the coming years.

Unlike the construction sector, the ferry route is an area in which success has been a result of both private and government initiatives. For example the introduction of the railway ro-ro service is provided for in joint agreement between the Greek and Syrian governments. The question of who will be responsible for the practical operation of the ferry itself however is still open and a government spokesman is reported as saying that "the state is not keen" to become involved in the operation of the new ferry.

The major criticism of the government in this area has come from the people of Volos themselves who charge that the state has been too slow in establishing proper infrastructure facilities at Volos to cater for the inflow of drivers and trucks now invading the city. On the government side it is pointed out that the rate of growth of traffic through Volos has taken everybody by surprise but the government does not under-estimate the huge potential of Volos as a transit centre. To this end Merchant Marine Minister Kefaloyannis reported recently that he was urging the Ministry of Coordination to implement a study on the establishing of a free zone at the Volos port and had already earmarked a sum of \$55,000 for such a study. Also in hand is a \$14 million plan, on which work has already started, for a rail head and container terminal at Volos which is aimed to make the port one of the major ro-ro and container terminals in the

Value of Greek construction projects in the Arab world (1976)

Country	Company	Project value (million drs.)	Greek personnel employed abroad
Cameroon	Edok-Eter	1,000	50
Gabon	Edok-Eter	1,000	50
Iran	Scapaneus	6,600	350
Iran	Helleniki Techniki	30,000	80
Iraq	Scapaneus	3,600	250
Iraq	Helleniki Techniki	16,000	
Kuwait	Helleniki Techniki	4,000	
Libya	ETE	1,000	100
Libya	Xekte	1,800	200
Libya	Epirotiki	2,500	300
Libya	Archimedes	800	80
Nigeria	Edok-Eter	10,000	270
Saudi Arabia	Odon & Odostromaton	600	
Saudi Arabia	Archirodon	36,000	700
Saudi Arabia	Edok-Eter	10,000	600
Saudi Arabia	Thales	2,500	300
Saudi Arabia	Aleamat	2,000	200
Saudi Arabia	Heraklis	1,000	50
Saudi Arabia	Meton	300	50
Syria	Domiki	300	20
Syria	Edok-Domika Erga	2,000	200
Syria	Technodomiki	200	100
UAE	Archirodon	7,000	100
Others	Various	9,300	500
TOTAL		150,000	4,500

Source: Technical Chamber of Greece.

Mediterranean by 1983 capable of handling four container vessels simultaneously.

With just 4 percent of trucks carried on the route being Greek and most vehicles returning by ferry also (in 1978 on total 8,023 trucks made the journey from Volos either to Tartus or Lattakia of which 6,540 returned), the capacity of the route as a foreign exchange earner is self-evident. Replacing the long overland haul through Turkey, and thus reducing wear and tear on vehicles, the ferry service is obviously very attractive to transport companies, particularly

when it compares so well on a cost basis. The Greek shipping magazine Naftiliaki recently reported a cost comparison between overland and ferry haulage from Greece to Jordan (Amman) and back as follows: (for a 15 metre trailer)

By road

Fuel:	220
Taxes:	1,250
Extras:	150
Total:	\$1,620

By ferry

Fuel:	70
Taxes:	448
Ferry:	1,500
Total:	\$2,018

It is interesting to note that the principal saving by travelling on the ferry route is in taxes. A further point worth noting however is that if a transport company has a contract with one of the ferry lines then reductions of up to 30 percent can be obtained on ferry prices thus making costs similar on both routes.

Industrial Development Bank and others were as follows:

a) The importance of the Middle East as a market for Greek product groups varied in 1977 from 0.8 percent for electric products and telephone apparatus to 99.6 percent for carpentry and joinery products. In general, the Middle East is an important market for Greek building materials and processed

Greece's trade deficit with Middle East and North African countries (in million drs.)

1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978
1,627	1,479	5,478	5,920	16,184	18,144	11,477	4,033

* For January to August period only. The figure for the same period in 1977 was 10,456 million drs.

Trade developments

Despite any real programme, Greek exports to the Arab world have been increasing at a greater rate than those to other countries and last year represented just over 20 percent of total Greek exports compared with a figure of 7.5 percent in 1973. A large part of that 20 percent was accounted for by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt who are the four major purchasers of Greek goods. Another peculiar feature that is reflected in statistical figures is that the 20 percent of Greek exports destined for Arab countries is made up of only 35 to 40 different products, a very limited range.

To conclude the article perhaps the best general picture of Greek-Arab trade in the context of Greece's trade as a whole can be summarised from the facts presented by Greece's Ambassador to the Arab States, Prof. Georgakis, at the first General Assembly of the CDC. His main conclusions drawn from various studies by the CDC, the Hellenic

fruit, but much less so for most of Greece's other traditional exports.

b) Saudi Arabia is now the most important market, Greek exports having grown by 14.5 times between 1973 and 1977. Its relative importance increased further in 1978.

c) The importance of different countries for an individual product varies considerably. Thus Libya dominates the market for steel pipes and tubes, Saudi Arabia dominates the market for aluminium building products, Jordan and Iraq the market for disinfectants, herbicides, etc. and Kuwait the market for shoes. This situation should suggest, a priori, market opportunities in the other countries.

d) There is considerable fluctuation from year to year in the importance of individual countries for some products. This probably reflects the "opportunistic" nature of Greek export promotion in the region.

e) In several product groups, notably in the food sector, Greek exports to the region are more important than Italian exports.

Even Greek exports of pastas (spaghetti, etc.) to the Arab countries were worth two thirds of Italian pasta exports in 1976.

Although the Middle East is an important market for Greece, the

country is only a marginal supplier to Arab markets in general taking a share of imports in the seven major Arab countries, ranging from 0.5 percent in Kuwait to 2.6 percent in Libya. In the latter, Greece's market share has fallen substantially since 1974, and, judging from data for the early months of 1978, is continuing to fall. In the largest market of all, Saudi Arabia, the Greek share has also been falling a little and is currently some 0.9 percent. In the second largest market, Algeria, Greek exports fell in 1977 to only 0.2 percent of that country's imports. This downward tendency of the Greek market share is not shared by other European countries, at least in the major Saudi market: the EEC's share of Saudi imports rose from 25 percent to 31 percent from 1975 to 1977 and Italy's share from 3.9 percent to 5.8 percent in the same period.

On the other hand it should be noted that Greece's market share in the Arab countries is substantially higher than its overall level of exports would suggest. In total, Greek exports are worth

about 7 percent of Italian exports, but in the Arab markets they average about 15 percent - a notable performance in a highly competitive environment, only partly due to the advantage in terms of transport costs.

Two general guidelines on export promotion are concluded by Prof. Georgakis:

a) The importance of Algeria

as a potential market. Although not analysed in a detailed manner, Algeria is the second largest Arab importer and is relatively close, geographically, to Greece. Yet Greece's market share of about 0.2 percent is the lowest in the region.

b) In almost all products/product groups, there are countries in which Greece's market share is nil or almost nil. This would indicate that there are still major opportunities for Greek producers even in fields in which they are strong. The markets of Kuwait and Iraq are the least often exploited by Greek producers - a reflection perhaps of the transport problems so often cited in Greece as a hindrance to exports to the Arab world.

PSI'S ACCAME ON REDUCING WASTEFULNESS BY THE MILITARY

Rome AVANTI in Italian 12/13 Aug 79 p 13

[Article by Falco Accame, parliamentary deputy and head of the Italian Socialist Party's Defense Section: "Energy: Armed Forces Too Can Help Lower Consumption"]

[Text] With the energy crisis that in the next few months will tighten its stranglehold on the nation, a question arises as to armed forces training activities, which alone absorb a significant proportion of the total national consumption.

Can anything be done in this sector, considering that training necessarily involves consumption?

I believe something can be done under several aspects--such as, for example, reduction of wastefulness, and planning of equipment and installations, of equipment inventories, and of training methods.

Let us start with the first of these headings: elimination of wastefulness. This is a subject we have touched upon in the past, in parliamentary session during the previous legislature and again very recently. We cite here two cases: maintenance of an active Air Force acrobatic air patrol, and the recent dispatch of three warships to Vietnam to pick up "boat people."

Regarding the acrobatic air patrol, the question is whether the fuel consumption involved is justified. It is asserted that this patrol performs an essential promotional function abroad; but is this promotional function indispensable? Much richer countries than ours, like the Federal Republic of Germany, do not permit themselves this luxury. Its training value to pilots is virtually nil, because pilots who go into acrobatic training are already supertrained; moreover, such training is not pointed toward operational requirements (close tactical support during air and ground actions) which should be the specific role of G-91 aircraft.

In substance, the maintenance in being of this patrol, even granting the importance of tradition and of the "parade," is, all things considered, a waste, hence a sector in which we could economize.

As regards the second of the two cases cited, the use of three warships--two cruisers and one support ship--sent to Vietnam, this is something that could have been avoided. It would have been far less costly to use chartered airplanes and a chartered merchant ship.

As to the second major heading: military equipment and vehicle procurement planning. We must direct our sights toward armed forces structured for maximum possible economies of scale. Until now we have often acted in the opposite direction. An army claiming to be strictly defensive and seeking 1,500 combat tanks--equipment that certainly is more offensive than defensive (enemy tanks can be stopped much more economically with antitank weapons than with tanks!)--cannot really claim to be trying to economize. Likewise, a navy that seeks a 13,000 ton (no less) flattop cruiser and seeks to have it powered by gas turbines, which are notoriously uneconomical of fuel consumption, and, likewise, an air force that procures Lockheed's gigantic, totally underutilized Hercules C 130 aircraft as well as 100 MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) (at 20 billion lire each) cannot be said to be basing their operational planning on economies of scale. The use of equipment that consumes large quantities of fuel must be curtailed and appropriate qualitative solutions to the problem adopted.

Lastly, training. Training cannot be dispensed with. But not all of it must be field training. Training today can in large measure be based on "simulators"--plane and helicopter flight simulators, maritime navigation simulators for training in the handling of ships, ground operations simulators--all based on the possibilities offered in this field by electronic computers. Orientation towards simulation can enable a not inconsiderable savings in training.

Aside from the above sectors there is still another one in which military consumption is heavy: heat for barracks installations and bases, 90 percent of which are located in the Northeast. The requirement for maintaining an army near the Yugoslav frontier is today to be considered outdated both because, especially since the Osimo treaty, the threat from the Northeast has certainly diminished, and because with modern air and naval troop-landing techniques a landing is possible anywhere along the peninsula. Our forces should therefore be more evenly distributed over the entire territory, which involves relocating troops from the North to the South, where heating requirements are less and a reduction in this maintenance cost is possible.

And a final note: the huge number of blue automobiles used to carry high-ranking military officers from home to their offices must be reduced. Use of public transportation for this purpose can also constitute a response to the need to economize.

The armed forces represent an area of consumption that must be studied without delay so as to avoid drastic last-minute solutions and improvisations that aside from other considerations could result detrimental to the effectiveness of those armed forces.

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CSD: 3104

PCI'S CHIAROMONTE ON PARTY'S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 10 Aug 79 pp 1-2

[Article by Gerardo Chiaromonte: "The Communists' Involvement"; material enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Among the many events that have taken place in this complicated post-election crisis is the invitation (extended to us by some socialist comrades, particularly comrade Riccardo Lombardi, and by comrades of the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party]) to abstain from opposing the government in Parliament--to join in enabling "governance" of the country and not place the burden in this sense entirely on the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]. The stated intent behind this invitation was to mount a /joint/ action of the left, which, starting from a unanimous vote of confidence in the government, could in the next few months be turned /against/ the DC [Christian Democratic Party].

We were tempted at various moments to speak ironically of this request, coming as it did from comrades who had so harshly criticized our abstention after 20 June 1976, when (it should not be forgotten) the political and parliamentary situation resulting from that abstention, and from the joint one by the PSI, the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party], and the PRI [Italian Republican Party], represented a step forward with respect to the previous political and parliamentary situation, and a possible prelude to the effective policy of democratic solidarity that we and other forces were demanding (the PSI, in a subsequent congress, joined in the call for democratic unity). But this is not a time for facile irony. The issue cannot be taken lightly, and can be considered (aside from the intentions of the comrades who proposed that we abstain) as an umpteenth campaign against us; this time against our alleged lack of involvement, or our systematic and vindictive intransigence which disregards the basic interests of the nation. As recently as a few days ago, comrade Cicchitto repeated the joke about the PCI [Italian Communist Party] "bunkering" its position.

It is appropriate therefore that we repeat that we do not feel in the least disinvolved: not even since last January when we were compelled to recognize the disintegration of the core of democratic unity because of failure on the

part of the DC and other parties to fulfill various and specific requirements of the agreed program, and of the breakdown of even the least semblance of unity between the majority parties. It must also be recalled that it was not we who chose the role of the opposition: We are the only one of the major parties, in fact, whose right to take part in a coalition government is not so much as recognized by the DC and others. It is not we, therefore, who can decide whether to enter the government or remain out of it (as, basically, the PSI can): and it is this kind of political discrimination--aside from the experience we have so painfully acquired in recent years--which drives us into the position we have taken.

Our vote against the Cossiga government signifies, in the first place, an absolutely negative assessment of what has taken place during these months of interminable government crisis: the maneuvers, the stipulations, the vetoes, the blackmail, no discussion whatever on programs and things to be accomplished. It also signifies, naturally, a negative assessment of the government that was finally formed; a government that, notwithstanding the incorporation of a few new and positive elements, appears quite weak and of inadequate caliber to deal with the serious problems that confront the nation --a government that is still based, despite Cossiga's affirmations and assurances, on apportionment and distribution of posts among the DC's party groupings and factions. Some ministries have even been split up (whose consolidation had been characterized only a short time ago as a significant forward step toward a functional improvement in the government) to appease the groups to which men like Evangelisti and Scalia belong. This is all very disquieting at a grave moment in the history of our nation and as ever more threatening clouds gather on the world horizon. Our opposing vote further expresses our protest against such profound national irresponsibility on the part of the DC and other parties.

Besides being a weak government right from the start, the intent is that it moreover be committed to inaction, as is clear from the first statements of the leaders of the parties that are to keep it in being. The secretary of the Social Democratic Party--though he was not the only one--said it: a government that should not act but simply permit, through its existence, the smoothing out of differences among the parties and the undertaking of new solutions (but which solutions?) Disinvolvement on our part, indeed! The PCI's opposition is needed to compel everyone to put aside these absurd arguments, force the government into action to resolve the existing problems, and to bring about the substantive rebuilding of unity among the democratic forces, beginning with unity among the forces of the left.

Facts speak louder than words, and the facts are beginning to prove that the most effective political approach is the one we are indicating: unity of the democratic forces, in the absence of which, as long as traditional anticommunist discrimination continues, there can be nothing but continued confusion, inaction, and permanent political crisis. The pursuit of other dreams--like returning to the center-left, even though broadened to include the PLI [Italian Liberal Party], or even with some "switches" in its direction--cannot, in our opinion, but exacerbate the crisis and render the nation increasingly ungovernable.

We certainly do not expect all the forces and leaders of the left to share in this opinion of ours. But we also trust that no one expects to compel us to believe that the difficulties in the current Italian political situation stem (as Eugenio Scalfari and others preach) from our persistent refusal to provide /guarantees/ in regard to our international ties and the rules governing the internal workings of our party. We continue to believe that Italy is still in the midst of a full-fledged, grave crisis which is all the more disturbing because it is taking place within the context of an international situation that is becoming increasingly tense.

To bring the country out of and on top of this crisis in a democratic way requires the dedication of all the forces and men of the left: if they wish to be and to be considered a governing force. This is why on 6 July we invited the PSI, during a meeting we had with a delegation of that party on the governmental crisis, to an in-depth discussion between our two parties on the urgent problems to be addressed jointly in Parliament and throughout the country, and in general on the prospects of unity among the forces of the left in Italy and Western Europe--without affecting the diverse positions the two parties might take in Parliament toward the government (furthermore, without seeking, for our part, to exploit the differences between our positions). We look forward to the success of the initiative toward unity undertaken recently by the PDUP. A discussion and settling of differences among the forces and leaders of the left are needed on various issues--and on how to defend the democratic state against the assault of terrorism and violence, as well as on how to implant in the young generations the ideals and values of freedom, of democracy, and of national solidarity against all forms of particularism and heightened individualism. The issues to be discussed include the DC's current situation, its future as a party, its forthcoming congress. We cannot remain indifferent to these questions nor, much less, express sometimes diametrically opposite opinions as to what is going on in the DC, and continue pursuing diverse objectives.

Specifically, we believe the Cossiga government must fulfill its function, which is to govern, and start doing it now, in August. It must move without mistakes and urgently on the pressing issue of the eviction notices that have during the past few weeks been served on tens of thousands of citizens and helpless people; on the problems of industries in crisis or in difficulties; on prices, where no increase must be permitted on staple items of prime necessity, and where increases on other items must not be granted for the simple asking; on the serious problems of energy and petroleum products, where there is an immediate need to draw up an effective energy conservation plan to be enforced in accordance with rigorously equitable criteria. It appears to us essential also to designate and put to work forthwith a qualified technical commission to study the nuclear power plant safety problem and forward urgently to Parliament a report enabling formulation of an energy plan worthy of its name. We have cited by way of examples only a few of the most pressing issues and could add many others. Our nation must not again find itself skidding out of control this fall in the fight against inflation, for employment of our youth, for southern Italy, for democratic law and order, for schooling and

university education. This demands, therefore, not only an unflagging, diligent and meaningful parliamentary thrust to prod the government in these directions, but also a very vast and combative initiative throughout the country--by the masses.

Disinvolverent indeed! Bunkering indeed! We are calling all our units into this thrust and drive. It requires exceptional involvement of a political, cultural, propagandistic and organizational nature. We are fully aware of it; to carry out this action requires a united and fighting party, which can be achieved on the one hand if all communist militants become increasingly aware of the exception and difficult moment our country and the world are traversing, of the vast potential that opens before us but also of the grave dangers that can hinder and bring to a halt our democratic and socialistic fight, and, on the other hand, if we continue our advance along the line of political and cultural renovation on which we set out quite some time ago and which found its most recent expression in the proceedings of the 15th Congress. We have all taken part during the last few weeks in a heated debate which in fact continues. The pages of L'UNITA and RINASCITA are open to this debate which we deem necessary for an understanding of all that has taken place and is taking place in our society, in our country and in the entire world; for an in-depth analysis of our limitations and errors; and for correcting them and continuing our advance. In this issue of RINASCITA we are publishing a discussion on democratic centralism, that is, on the rules we again applied to our proceedings during the 15th Congress. We wish to continue debating within these rules, which assure /to all our militants and members/ equal rights and responsibilities and wide margins of freedom. We will thus closely examine the differences that exist among us on all issues, making every effort to broaden the internal democracy of the party apparatus; we will at the same time concern ourselves with raising the competence and level of knowledge of our leadership (without which all differences would remain unresolved).

It is a complex and difficult effort which is certainly not facilitated by the attitude of those comrades who prefer to set forth their opinions--and conduct a political offensive--in the pages of newspapers and magazines which among other things appear at this moment to be engaged in a tenacious and insidious action against us. To combine with our internal debate external political action, unitary action, organization and leadership of the fight by the major masses of the people and the workers, aggressive defense of our party line and of what we represent in the history and the culture of our country--these appear to us to be our involvement, the tasks to which we must dedicate ourselves, today.

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C80: 3104

RECONCILIATION ATTEMPTS AT NONALINED SUMMIT VIEWED

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 4 Sep 79 pp 1, 13 LD

[Commentary by Ennio Polito: "Reconciliation Effort Over Final Document"]

[Text] Havana--A strong reassertion of Cuba's identity and of the postures which characterize it within the "nonalined" movement. This seems to be the general sense of the speech with which Fidel Castro began the Havana summit. The Cuban leader did not hesitate to stress most clearly the discrepancy between Cuba's theories and the formulations which Cuba accepted in its draft final document, by accepting most of the amendments put forward by the majority. Cuba is loyal to its radical "anti-imperialist" vocation, regards China's options as a manifestation of "opportunism" and "collusion" with the forces oppressing the majority of mankind and stands alongside the USSR and the countries which follow the path of Soviet policy. This analysis makes little concession to the complexity of the world situation and equates situations which are not always comparable on the basis of the "constant element" of the presence of imperialism. Castro remains convinced that "nonalinedment" cannot and must not ignore this fact.

So has the great reconciliation effort made during the past few days been in vain and is the conflict bound to resume? Such an interpretation would probably be distorted. The amended draft, Castro said, is "good," though it could be "improved by making it stronger." But Cuba "does not want to impose its viewpoints on anyone."

The work on the document continues. Where does the demarcation line between the various postures lie? An initial factor which can be noted is the absence of explicit references to the "natural alliance" between the movement and the socialist camp, to which the Cuban leaders have referred in the past. On the contrary, a long item is devoted to "strengthening the independent role" of the movement itself, whose essence is identified primarily in the struggle "against imperialism, colonialism, racism and all forms of occupation, domination, interference and foreign hegemony." There is a pronouncement "in favor of active peaceful coexistence and against splitting the world into

military alliances or blocs" and a rejection of "every foreign policy based on blocs, spheres of influence and the balance of terror." This topic is returned to in the definition of the principles of coexistence and of the prerequisites for detente and security and, later, there is reconfirmation of adherence to the principle of "noninterference in states' internal affairs," whose violation is "totally unacceptable and incompatible with UN principles."

Following the efforts made, therefore, has there been any attenuation of the much-discussed conflicts? The still numerous critics of the document appear to doubt it, maintaining that the responsibility for the violation of principles and for the quest for "spheres of influence" must in fact be sought in one direction only, leaving general statements aside. They cite events in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada. There is no mention of events in the Horn of Africa. And when Southeast Asia is discussed, it is discussed in general terms, noting positive "efforts" which are at present no more than hopes.

Moreover, once again at a press conference held yesterday at the conference hall Vietnamese Minister Nguyen Co Tach outlined a different picture, denouncing the multiplication of "provocations" and the massing of Chinese troops on the borders and the resumption of "threats" against Vietnam from the Beijing leaders, and confirming that the Vietnamese will remain in Cambodia "for as long as the Chinese threat to Vietnam's [as published] survival exists." To remain outside the blocs, the Vietnamese minister added, "is a fundamental principle of the nonaligned countries, but their final objective is the struggle against imperialism" and China and the United States are trying to "divert" the movement from this objective. "Not only is there the principle of nonintervention, but there is also the principle of solidarity," Nguyen Co Tach said later, resuming the polemic with the Yugoslavs, who are accused of remaining silent during China's attack on his country.

Another comment made on the draft final document concerns an imbalance between the part devoted to the liberation struggle of the Latin American, African and Asian peoples and the part devoted to the problems of eliminating the blocs in Europe, which is in fact an integral part of the arguments of nonalignment. The critics say that the progress made in this direction and the Helsinki Act are discussed in just a few lines.

Apparently less emphasis was placed on the disagreement over Egypt than at the Colombo meeting of ministers in June. To the clear reassertion of the "centrality" of the Palestinian issue in the Middle Eastern conflict and an equally clear condemnation of the Camp David accords and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, expressed in the terms already adopted at Colombo, the document apparently merely adds a comment to the effect that al-Sadat "has detached himself from the policy and has violated the accords of the nonaligned countries."

However, it seems that broad consensus emerged from the debate on the economic part of Cuba's draft, which apparently underwent few if any amendments. The fundamental points listed are apparently as follows:

- 1) A strong denunciation of the aggravation of the imbalance between the industrialized Western countries and the Third World as a result of the crisis which has emerged within the former countries;
- 2) the struggle for economic cooperation represents the continuation of and the development of the Third World liberation struggle;
- 3) the demand for "global negotiations," whose natural forum is the United Nations. The West, it is said, must accept the idea of an economic reconversion and of Third World participation in its decisions;
- 4) the plan for the struggle against the wastage of resources must center on a scale of inviolable priorities;
- 5) the condemnation of the protectionist measures pursued by the West in the attempt to postpone the definition of a new international economic order.

In the next few hours Cuban Minister Malmierca's report on the proceedings of the committees working on preparations for the summit should provide more precise indications of the nature and limits of the consensus achieved.

CSO: 3104

VARIOUS STRANDS OF NONALINED MOVEMENT ANALYZED

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Sep 79 pp 1, 6 LD

[Commentary by Ennio Polito: "On Trial in a Tormented World"]

[Text] Havana--The Sixth Nonaligned Summit has ended with a complex result. On the credit side there is an undoubted and very significant success. This time again, as always on previous occasions, the representatives of such a broad and heterogeneous alignment found themselves united on demands crucial to the future of mankind, the full realization of Palestine's self-determination, the Arab states' sovereign rights and the liberation of the African majorities of southern Africa from the racist minorities' domination, irrespective of any resistance or schemes on the part of the opposed parties, and the satisfaction of the Third World's aspirations to a "new international economic order," irrespective of any obstructionism or deafness on the part of the industrialized world.

Furthermore once again the final document fully confirms the movement's fundamental inspiration: independence from the blocs and from power politics, the commitment to active peaceful coexistence involving real international cooperation and the rejection of any form of occupation, domination, hegemony or interference in the states' internal affairs.

On the debit side there is evidence of a danger: namely that the opposition between two or more views of the world which emerged from the debate may become more acute in the years ahead and subject the movement--in an international situation providing more and more new reasons for concern and alarm--to tensions and splits which would diminish its great influence as a factor for peace and progress on the world stage.

Two views of the world and of the roads along which the peoples can emancipate themselves from the forces oppressing them and of the "non-aligned" movement in this process are emerging, as has already been observed, from the statements and conduct of the Yugoslavs and the Cubans.

Fidel Castro sees two very clearly defined "camps": On the one hand imperialism, colonialism and the racist regimes; on the other the Latin American, African and Asian liberation movements involved in a struggle which should lead them to bring about radical breakaways and transformations, basically in accordance with the models of the socialist "camp" and in close unity with it. As far as he is concerned, the emphasis should be placed on what the situations have in common; the differences--even the major ones--are attenuated to the extent of almost disappearing.

Behind Castro's outlook, behind his demand for a revolutionary "ethic" and behind the identification of compromise with "cowardice" lie Cuba's historical experience, the long night of the peoples of the three continents, their suffering and centuries-long struggle for liberation from humiliating forms of dependence in what we could call the "lowest points" of the capitalist system.

Tito--as he himself pointed out--undertook the long and tiring journey to Havana to say something which concerns him and which should concern everybody. He, too, represents an original experience--and one which is certainly no less "revolutionary" or less consistent or less similar to an "ethic." In his long and therefore all the more valuable memory the dominant factors are the comparison with the attempts at oppression originating from the very "camp" to which Yugoslavia once belonged, the formulation of new roads for advancing not only socialism and national independence but also the quest for a position which would enable the country to act as a "bridge" (according to the image suggested by the Yugoslavs themselves) between Europe, to which it belongs, and the former colonial world, with whose aspirations it feels an affinity, and the building of a new international force, namely "nonalignment," capable of making the big countries take the desires of the others into account.

The foremost of the important things which Tito came to say in Havana is the reminder that, irrespective of its splits, the world is a unit and that the transition "from an ancient order based on domination to a new order based on freedom, equality and social justice, which lead to prosperity," as discussed at the First Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961, affects everyone and demands everyone's efforts--those of the democratic and socialist forces present in Western Europe with a major historical heritage and with great maturity no less than those of the countries in which social breaks have already taken place and those of the Third World vanguards, partly because in a world without peace and without cooperation among the various systems, those breaks would not be followed by the development indispensable for surmounting their traumatic consequences, whereas it is this development that guarantees the continuity of progress.

Hence stems the prime importance of the defense and consolidation of peace, of the building of a security system no longer based on

"bipolarism" and opposed military blocs with "rules of the game" accepted by and valid for all, of the commitment of the two "camps" on the one hand and the Third World on the other to restructuring the world economy in the general interests. Therefore "nonalignment," with the historical results achieved in all these directions, in fact qualifies as "the most progressive force on a world scale," as the force which "destroys the foundations of the unjust international relations of our era and creates the conditions for a new world."

How is the progress to be continued? Here, too, there are different views. The Yugoslavs maintain that advancing the detente process essentially implies taking it beyond the limits delineated by the interests of the major powers and the blocs, attenuating their rivalries and the risks of conflict which they involve. It is in Europe, they say, that the greatest progress has taken place in this field, and from Europe peace and security must spread to the entire world. The Cubans' viewpoint is different. Above all, the Yugoslavs view with concern the conflicts between "nonaligned" countries, since they "open the door to foreign interference." The Cubans have clearly chosen sides in the conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. The Yugoslavs regard the "new international economic order" as the decisive goal. The Cubans accept the postures of the nonaligned countries on this topic but the emphasis lies elsewhere.

We said two viewpoints. But there are others as well, with differences which cannot always be attributed to mere nuances. There is that of the Asian, African and Latin American countries which, united with the Yugoslavs in supporting the movement's "historical" aspirations, are also particularly sensitive to voices calling for a new mobilization of forces against the vestiges of the imperialist system; and there is the opposite viewpoint which regards more or less obvious forms of association with the former colonial powers and of anti-Sovietism as the guarantee of "moderate" approaches on the political and social planes. Last, there is the viewpoint of Vietnam, whose pronouncements have been so dominated by the logic of a conflict with "millenary" Chinese tyrannical aspirations as to have objectively reduced the significance of its professions of loyalty to the political tradition of the rejection of blocs.

It is important that these differences did not obscure, in the conclusions, the areas of agreement on problems which are, as we have said, crucial. Nonalignment's strength has always lain in this ability to find, through differing languages, specific and working understandings. If this ability were to be wasted in the future, the consequences for the future of the world would be grave.

MILITARY JOURNAL EMPHASIZES ROLE OF CONSCRIPT SERVICE

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 8 Aug 79 p 15

[Article: "Impossible To Abolish Conscription in Italy"]

[Text] An article in the latest issue of the RIVISTA MILITARE affirms: "The abolition of conscription and converting to a voluntary armed forces system in Italy appear to be impossible. A conscript army can be of excellent quality despite the increase in technicalization and sophistication of equipment and its use. The conscript army must however be adequately motivated and trained, to render it universally acceptable and to ensure participation by all its personnel in the lifestyle and activities of its units.

"Draftees must furthermore be integrated with the regulars who are needed to man the unit cadres and to provide the required logistical support of the equipment issued to the unit."

According to the article, there are "undoubtedly some very real deficiencies" which "can be overcome by improving the conditions under which conscript service is conducted." It is especially necessary "that all military draftees be assigned combat-type duties and not be used to perform administrative and office-type functions pertaining to garrison activities. Civilian personnel should be substituted in the latter functions.

"Draftees used to fill these functions," the article adds, "feel they are being used as low-cost employees, as unpaid laborers. This leads to morale problems, drawbacks of a training nature, and a certain laxity, all of which must be eliminated." The article also proposes "recognition in the form of economic and regulatory considerations to be granted to those who have completed their service as draftees, resulting in some advantages over those who for one reason or another are not called up."

The article goes on to say: "The growing sophistication of military equipment does not necessarily entail increased difficulty in its operation. In many cases it is indeed the contrary. The requirements which can absolutely not be fulfilled by draftees are those of the maintenance and repair of modern weapons systems. The training required for these functions is of such

duration and complexity as to necessitate entrusting it to long-term voluntary personnel." Therefore, "it is indispensable to enact the required conditions for recruiting the voluntary personnel provided by law--volunteers who in the present state of things cannot be found because existing incentives are insignificant and discouraging."

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COMMENTARY ON EEC'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 8 Aug 79 p 6

[Article by Giorgio Amadei: "The EEC's Agricultural Policy Is Wrong and Costly"]

[Text] Returning from the latest exhausting round of negotiations on agricultural prices, Minister of Agriculture Marcora heard himself severely criticized. The price agreement--he was told--does nothing more than perpetuate an EEC agricultural policy that is wrong and costly; hence, before negotiating agricultural prices, that policy should have been "reformed."

Marcora's reply was simple. He said that for Italian farmers the new prices were a necessary shot in the arm, and that the importance of survival far outweighs that of its quality. An obstinate stand on "reform" would probably have succeeded only in plunging European agriculture into deep turmoil. In fact, though it is true that everyone dislikes the EEC agricultural policy, it is equally true that everyone disagrees as to the reasons why it fails to work and as to what should be done to reform it. In this regard, it is well to cite some of the opposing viewpoints concerning the EEC agricultural policy.

The first and most widely held maintains that the EEC agricultural policy is in itself not wrong, but that its fault lies in its being mismanaged and, moreover, in its being inadequately complemented. This viewpoint places the blame for these faults not on the Executive Commission, which is responsible for recommending the various price levels and regulatory guidelines, but on the Council of Ministers, which decides the actual form and substance of the measures for implementing the agricultural policy. The latter organization, tightly bound to national governments, proves to be a mediocre interpreter of the "community interest" and nothing more than a convenient stage in the negotiation of conflicting national interests.

According to this viewpoint: The greater one's clout the greater one's take despite Europe; and hence the decisions taken at Brussels often lead to EEC imbalances resulting from overprotection of some farm products and of some areas and causing trade and financial imbalances for other areas. It is no news, for example, that cereals, milk products, meats and sugar enjoy greater

protection than fruits, vegetables and wines. This has repercussions on the economic levels of the various areas within the EEC, enhancing the progress of the northern zones and hindering that of the southern zones.

The effect is all the more evident because of the fact that productive means (farms, capital and organizational structures) in the southern zones are weaker than those in the northern zones.

It follows therefore that if these are the defects a reform could consist of a general rebalancing both of price levels--to equalize the protection of the various products--and of the measures aimed at improving the weaker agricultural structures--by way of more intensive interventions designed to stimulate economic and social development in the underdeveloped areas. These are guidelines that have already been adopted by the EEC but that have been followed up only on a very small scale (because they are costly). In addition, the agricultural policy must be complemented by a coherent general economic policy--by industrial, credit, trade, and other policies.

A second viewpoint, opposed to the first, maintains that the error of the EEC agricultural policy was an initial one, when it was decided to fix prices authoritatively without regard for the actual scarcity of agricultural products on the market. Perhaps it was legitimate for Europe to seek a high degree of self-sufficiency in wheat and milk, which are basic nutritional staples, and therefore to provide highly protective customs barriers for these products. But it was dangerous and absurd to fix all or almost all other prices, removing itself from the world market and distorting the internal market.

Initially, in fact, concern for existing conditions of supply and demand led to crucial decisions. Then, from year to year, errors accumulated rapidly in an unrelenting crescendo. Today, for example, the guaranteed price of corn in the EEC is almost equal to that of wheat, a fact that does not occur in any part of the world where a minimum market exists, and that has no economic basis whatever when the cost of producing corn is significantly lower than that of wheat. True, the world market is a mediocre reference for defining the prices of products, subject as it is to speculation and a myriad of other deforming factors, but it is always better than the groundless views of ministers and bureaucrats, who are subject to the various corporate pressures.

Thus, from this viewpoint, the appropriate reform is not to complement and extend the complex EEC protective system but rather to dismantle it, though with due caution. As is evident, this conclusion totally contradicts the preceding one.

The question arises, then: Which of the two viewpoints is the better based in fact, and which reform the more suitable? Actually, the existence of a bureaucratic apparatus representing the germ of a possible future supranational state favors the first. What is more, the first viewpoint is now firmly rooted in the minds of the European farmers.

An equally strong factor, however, militates against it: its high cost. Thus, in the long run, if available resources are expected to become scarce and if the energy and monetary crises are expected to strike again, then the second viewpoint should prevail, since it is more suited to conservation of available financial resources. The danger lies in all of this coming about as a reaction to the errors of EEC dirigisme and under the illusion that free trade can exist within the EEC without a strong European regulatory authority.

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INDEPENDENTS ANNOUNCE CANDIDACY FOR SENATE ELECTIONS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 19 Aug 79 p 6

[Text] The Supreme Electoral Council has disclosed the names of the independent candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The AP [Justice Party]'s Mehmet Talat Seyhan, who was vetoed because he was "a friend of Minister of Public Works Serafettin Elci" and because of his "Kurdish leanings" submitted his candidacy as Senator from Mardin.

According to the disclosure by the Supreme Electoral Council the provisional candidate list is as follows: Abdullah Akin, Antalya primary school inspector for Bartın, İzzetin Öner (Hatay, mapping and land survey engineer), Bahriye Beria Ongel (Istanbul, retired lawyer, overall chairman of the İlerici Kadınlar Derneği [Society of Progressive Women], Niyazi Ağırnaslı (former Ankara Senator for the TIP [Turkish Labor Party], Recep Turel (Istanbul, primary school inspector for Samsun), Abdullah Yılmaz (Mardin, lawyer), Mehmet Talat Seyhan (Mardin, lawyer, candidacy repudiated by the AP "due to his friendship with Elci and his pro-Kurdish leanings), İsmail İlhan (Mus, graduate of the Law Faculty, Independent Senator from Mus), Mehmet Baklaci (Samsun, Primary school inspector for Ankara), Sevim Belli (Tokat, doctor, wife of Mihri Belli, overall chairman of the Turkish Workers' Party).

Aside from the above, Hüseyin Bilal (worker) submitted his candidacy as independent deputy from Edirne.

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PLO WILL NOT OPEN BUREAU IN TFSC

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] The head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Political Bureau Faruk Kaddumi, on a visit to Turkey for the signing of a protocol opening its mission in Ankara with full diplomatic authority and immunities, subsequently said that there was no need for the PLO to open a mission in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus because its mission in Lefkose [Nicosia] had been established for all of the people of Cyprus.

Faruk Kaddumi in a statement given to the English language newspaper in Ankara, DAILY NEWS, said as follows: "As you know we signed a protocol to open an office in Turkey. As for Cyprus we already have an office in Lefkose. This office was established to represent our organization for all of the people of Cyprus. We see Cyprus as an integral Cyprus.

In response to a question as to whether these words were intended to deny reports that his organization intended to open a separate office in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Faruk Kaddumi stated simply, "We do not see any necessity to open two separate offices in one country."

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GUNES: 'STEMMING URBAN MIGRATION WILL CURB ANARCHY'

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 19 Aug 79 p 4

[Interview by Olay Tan]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin, who is known as Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's right hand man and who is responsible for economic matters and Interior Minister Hasan Fehmi Gunes stated that their work is progressing well. In this connection Interior Minister Hasan Gunes said that obstacles were gradually being overcome with regard to the issue of security and added that if the migration from villages to the large cities were stopped then anarchism and terrorism would diminish.

In special statements to GUNAYDIN the two ministers, one responsible for the economy the other for public safety in the Ecevit government, explained that with every passing day public safety and the economy were improving and that the government was on the verge of getting things in hand.

Migration Must Be Halted

The Interior Minister made clear in his statement that we are compelled to formulate a national strategy against terrorism and continued as follows: "Masses of our populace who migrate from the villages to the large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, when faced with unemployment and housing problems fall into the toils of certain organizations. These illegal organizations put weapons into the hands of our youth and incite anarchy and terrorism. If the migration were prevented the impetus of anarchy would also be cut."

The Interior Minister furthermore added that anarchy and terrorism were being reduced at their origins and that the guilty were beginning to be caught.

"Three Months Later there will be an Abundance of Goods"

Moreover Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin said that the country had emerged from its economic straits and went on to add: "Foreign exchange which has been obtained through increases in foreign sales and credits have brought about a distinct relaxation. In the near future all the goods which have been in short supply will become abundant. With the measures we have taken our economy and our country will break into the clear."

RPP MAGAZINE RAPS VARIOUS LEFTIST FACTIONS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 18 Aug 79 p 14

[Text] The CHP [Republican People's Party] has given its appraisal of various left-wing splinter groups which it dubs "uninvited guests."

The magazine CHP'DEN HABERLER, which is the official monthly organ of the CHP, reflects upon the viewpoints of a number of the party's leftwing splinter groups under the headline "Uninvited Guests."

These left wing factions were assessed in the CHP'DEN HABERLER magazine in three main categories and the CHP view of these groups was given as follows:

1-The Devrimci Yol, Devrimci Sol, Halkin Kurtulusu, Partizan groups are composed of youths between the ages of 20-22 with their heads in the clouds and irregular, cloddish elements. They are stigmatized on the left as "anarchic adventurists" and "left opportunists."

2-The Apocu, Ozgurluk Yolu, Kava, Rizgari, Misak-1 and Milli'nin Yilmas Savunucusu groups are separatist elements made uneasy by the CHP's fight against the eastern peasants and outlaw bands.

3-The Ilerici Gencler Dernegix and the Ilerici Kadinlar Dernegi are in the position of being auxiliary organizations of the Turkish Communist Party. At first glance their slogans appear to be acceptable to the main body of the CHP. However, these groups are "saboteur-provocateur" groups that stealthily infiltrate the CHP and attempt to bring it under the direction of the Turkish Communist Party.

Leftism Is not Foreign Subservience

The CHP'DEN HABERLER magazine touched upon the latest incident at ODTU [Middle East Technical University], saying: "Those vagabond rebels who count it an accomplishment to remain seated when our national anthem is played and to sing the "International" will go far enough in their campus dream world to bump their noses. Those who behind a mask of socialism would serve the imperialists do not have the worth of a fly in the eyes of the Turkish nation."

"These ignoramouses, who are not even aware that the "International" which they prize so highly and which was the national anthem of the Soviet Union, was changed in 1943 to a series of new marches beginning with "The Great Russian Nation", these uninvited guests should take pains to make sure that the patience of the CHP is not exhausted."

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